The number of highway concession contracts in North America is increasing rapidly with many
agencies turning to the public/private/partnership model to develop and build much needed
highway infrastructure. As agencies build on the PPP model, they transfer more risk to the
private sector including the risks associated with the operation, maintenance and rehabilitation
of the asset network. For most concessions, the pavements constitute a large percentage of
the cost to maintain. To ensure public safety and acceptable levels of service, agencies specify
key performance indicators and maintenance trigger values, as well as financial penalties to
ensure compliance. The transfer of risk, especially cost‐associated risk, permits more effective
budget planning for the agency.
The challenge for the agency is to establish key performance indicator limits to maximize public
benefits while minimizing PPP costs. The challenge to the concessionaire and pavement
management practitioner within the PPP context is to accurately judge and predict key
pavement performance indicators and maintenance/ rehabilitation actions to facilitate
compliance with project specifications while minimizing the cost to complete the work an
interruption to the travelling public. In addition, it is the goal of the agency to maximize the
value of the assets when they are eventually turned back to the public trust.
This paper examines conflicts between the binding requirements for maintenance activities and
the overall objective of effectively managing the pavement infrastructure.